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1 Introduction
This article considers the case where a single source of emissions (e.g. energy)
causes simultaneous localized and global externality problems (e.g. smog and
global warming), the issue of emission permits is delegated to an international
self-interested regulator whom the countries try to influence. A country faces
a penalty when it exceeds its permits. In this setting, it is instructive to see
how emission trading affects welfare and total emissions.
This article is motivated as follows. Under the European Union Emis-
sion Trading System, the governments of the EU Member States agree on
national emission caps which have to be approved by the EU commission,
and then allocate allowances to their industrial operators. Because countries
bargain over emission caps, but smog is external for the firms but not for the
countries, emission permit trading between firms makes a difference.
In a world of two goods and two primary inputs, emission trading may
increase emissions and make both trading partners worse off through the
terms-of-trade effect (Copeland and Taylor 2005). In this article, however,
I ignore the terms-of-trade effect with the assumption that there is one
internationally-traded good, for simplicity.
Caplan and Silva (2005) examine emission permit management in the
case where an independent and benevolent agent enacts international in-
come transfers, after the countries have chosen their respective endowments
of the local pollutant. They show that the introduction of domestic and
international permit markets commonly leads to Pareto efficiency. Accord-
ing to Caplan et al. (2003), an international policy scheme with permit
trading and redistributive transfers yields an efficient allocation for a global
economy. Gersbach and Winkler (2011) propose that a fraction of emission
permits is freely allocated, but the remainder is auctioned with revenues be-
ing reimbursed to member countries in fixed proportions. They show that if
the share of freely allocated permits is sufficiently small, this leads to socially
optimal emission reductions. In contrast to all of these articles, I assume that
the emission cap for a country is not given but endogenously determined by
bargaining between the local governments and the self-interested regulator.
MacGinty (2006) examines the stability of an international environmen-
tal agreement between asymmetric countries, showing that with international
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transfer payments the countries can establish stable coalitions with the ability
of reducing emission. Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2012) consider emission
trading when the governments set their national emission targets individually
and grant emission permits for the domestic firms. They show that the intro-
duction of emission permit trading increase emissions and decrease efficiency.
Godal and Holtsmark (2011) and MacKenzie (2011) obtain similar results.
Using a calibrated general equilibrium model, Carbone et al. (2009) show
that emission trade agreements can be effective. In contrast to all of these
articles, I assume that an international regulator issues emission permits.
Because a common agency game has no solution outside the steady state,
this article focuses on steady state analysis and ignores intertemporal trading
(cf. Liski and Montero 2005). Smith and Yates (2003) show that a fixed cap
for global pollution is inefficient, because the regulator, having imperfect
information about the benefits and damages of pollution, is unable to select
the efficient permit endowment. Malueg and Yates (2006) consider the case
where two interest groups – firms that generate pollution and households
that are harmed by the pollution – lobby the regulator that issues emission
permits. They show whether and on what conditions the households’ trade
in emission permits change the outcome. In this article, I examine the effect
of emission permit trading in the case where countries are the interest groups
that influence the self-interested international regulator.
Montgomery (1972), Shiell (2003) and MacKenzie et al. (2008) consider
the redistributive effects of the initial allocation of emission permits. To
focus entirely on bargaining over emission permits, I use the representative
household framework to ignore all such redistributive effects. While cf. Hin-
termann (2011) and Meunier (2011) consider the effects of market power or
asymmetric information efficiency, I assume a competitive emission permit
market where all agents share the same information.
Palokangas (2009) examines the case where a self-interested regulator
manages of emissions for a large number of identical countries with R&D-
based growth, showing that emission trading speeds up growth relative to
laissez-faire, but may slow down growth relative to centrally-determined
emission quotas. Palokangas (2014) considers the possibility of one-parameter
emission policy for countries with R&D-based growth, showing that if emis-
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sion caps are allocated in fixed proportion to past emissions (i.e. grandfather-
ing practise), the Pareto optimum can be attained. In contrast to Palokangas
(2009, 2014), I ignore the dynamics with R&D as an additional complication
in the model and examine a number of heterogeneous countries for which the
self-interested regulator runs emissions policy in this article.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of
the economy. Section 3 constructs Pareto optimum by assuming a benevolent
regulator, as a point of reference. Section 4 models the behavior of a self-
interested regulator, by which section 5 examines the use of country-specific
emission quotas and section 6 that of traded emission permits. Section 7
considers the effects of emission trading. Finally, section 8 generalizes the
results for the case where pollution is a stock, not a flow of emissions.
2 The economy
There is a large number (“continuum”) of countries j ∈ [0, 1] that produce
the same good from a single source of emissions (called hereafter energy, for
convenience) and fixed local resources (e.g. land and labor). The extraction
costs of energy are ignored, for simplicity. There is an international self-
interested regulator that grants emission permits. I assume for a while that
pollution is proportional to the flow of emissions, for tractability. In section
8, the results are generalized for the case where pollution is a stock.
In the model, the use of energy cause both global (called global warming)
and localized externality (called smog).1 I assume that global externality
can be represented by a single index M called green house gases (GHGs).
Defining the energy inputs mj for countries j ∈ [0, 1] in terms of GHGs yields
M
.
=
∫ 1
0
mjdj. (1)
Because smog nj is caused by the use of energy mj in the same country, the
latter can be used as a proxy of the former in the model. Then, without
1Smog plays two roles in the model. First, there is a laissez-faire equilibrium without
emission policy. If output were a function of energy input mj only, then country j would
use an infinite amount of energy in the laissez-faire case. With smog, there is a finite
upper limit mLj for the demand for energy in that case [cf. equation (5)]. Second, with
smog, emission permit trading distorts the allocation of resources [cf. section 6].
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losing any generality, one can assume
nj = mj. (2)
Country j produces the quantity fj of the final good from energy mj and
fixed factors. At the same time, smog nj causes welfare losses gj in terms of
the final good according to an increasing and convex function gj. Thus, the
net output of country j, yj, is determined by
yj = fj(mj)− gj(nj), f ′j > 0, f ′′j < 0, g′j > 0, g′′j > 0, fj(0) = gj(0) = 0.
(3)
Total consumption c is equal to the sum of the outputs yj of all countries:
c
.
=
∫ 1
0
yjdj =
∫ 1
0
[fj(mj)− gj(nj)]dj. (4)
Because isolation from international cooperation involves direct and in-
direct costs, I assume that country j ∈ [0, 1] faces fixed cost ξj, if it exceeds
its emission permits.2 With that cost, (2) and (3), the revenue of region j
for not participating in international emission policy is a constant
yj
.
= max
mj
[fj(mj)− gj(mj)]− ξj = fj(mLj )− gj(mLj )− ξj. (5)
where mLj
.
= arg maxmj [fj(mj)−gj(mj)] ≥ 0 is the laissez-faire energy input.
To avoid distributional considerations, I consider the representative house-
hold of the whole economy. This derives utility u from consumption c and
GHGs M according to the function
u(c,M), uc > 0, uM < 0, ucc < 0, uMM < 0, ucM ≡ 0, (6)
where the subscripts c and M denote the partial derivative of the function u
with respect to c and M , correspondingly.
2To obtain an equilibrium with lobbying, there must be some penalty for refusing to
participate in the lobbying game. Because this cost is an outside option which is never
paid in equilibrium, it is all the same whether ξj is a real loss of resources in the economy
or a payment to the other countries k 6= j.
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3 Pareto optimum
As a point of reference, I consider a benevolent regulator that maximizes
the welfare of the representative household, (6), by the emissions mj of all
countries j ∈ [0, 1], subject to global emissions (1), smog (2) and total con-
sumption (4). This maximization leads to the first-order conditions:
0 = uc
∂c
∂mj
+ um
∂M
∂mj
= uc(c,M)[f
′
j(mj)− g′j(mj)] + um(c,M) j ∈ [0, 1].
(7)
for j ∈ [0, 1]. The equations (2), (4) and (7) define the Pareto optimum –
Mp, cp and mpj for j ∈ [0, 1] – as follows:
Mp =
∫ 1
0
mpjdj, c
p =
∫ 1
0
[fj(m
p
j)− gj(mpj)]dj,
f ′j(m
p
j)− g′j(mpj) = −
uc(c
p,Mp)
um(cp,Mp)
for j ∈ [0, 1]. (8)
4 The self-interested regulator
With a self-interested regulator, the revenue of country j is equal to its
income yj minus its political contributions Rj to the regulator [cf. (3)]:
pij
.
= yj −Rj = fj(mj)− gj(nj)−Rj. (9)
Consumption c is then equal to the revenues pik from countries k ∈ [0, 1] plus
the regulator’s total revenue
∫ 1
0
Rkdk:
c =
∫ 1
0
pikdk +
∫ 1
0
Rkdk. (10)
To avoid distributional considerations that result from the payment of contri-
butions Rj, j ∈ [0, 1], I assume that all countries j ∈ [0, 1] and the regulator
belong to the representative household. This means that the regulator max-
imizes the utility of the representative household.3
3The assumption of the common representative household implies that the marginal
utility of income is the same for the regulator and the countries. The alternative is the
model of Dixit et al. (1997), in which the regulator’s utility W (u,R) is an increasing
function of both the household’s utility u and total political contributions R. With that
extension, distributional considerations would complicate the analysis, without any qual-
itative impact on the results that concern the subsidies and regulatory stardards.
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The political economy of the management of emissions can be expressed as
an extensive form game with the following stages: (I) The countries influence
the regulator by their prospective political contributions that depend on the
latter’s decisions. (II) The regulator decides its policy and collects political
contributions. (III) If emission permits are traded, then the international
market for them clears. (IV ) The local firms produce from energy and fixed
local resources. Next, I present two versions of this game: one with nontraded
(section 5), and the other with traded emission permits (section 6).
5 Emission quotas
Assume that the regulator determines nontraded emission permits (i.e. quo-
tas) mj for countries j ∈ [0, 1], but that countries themselves allocate their
quotas to the firms in efficient manner. The order of the game is then the
following. First, each country j ∈ [0, 1] sets its political contributions Rj
conditional on the regulator’s prospective policy mj. Second, the regula-
tor sets its policy {mj} .= {mj| j ∈ [0, 1]}, and collects the contributions
R
.
=
∫ 1
0
Rjdj. This extensive form game is solved in reverse order.
Country j observes smog (2). Because it influences the regulator by
its contributions Rj, its contribution schedule depends on the regulator’s
prospective policy mj. Given this and (2), its revenue (9) becomes
pij = fj(mj)− gj(mj)−Rj(mj). (11)
Given this and the contribution functions Rj(mj), consumption (10) becomes
c =
∫ 1
0
pikdk +
∫ 1
0
Rk(mk)dk. (12)
The regulator maximizes its utility (6) subject to total emissions (1) and
consumption (12), while each country j maximizes its revenue (11). Accord-
ing to Dixit at al. (1997), a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this game
is a set of contribution schedules Rj(mj) and a policy mj for all countries
j ∈ [0, 1] such that the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold true:
(i) Contributions Rj are non-negative but no more than the contributor’s
income.
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(ii) The policy {mj} .= {mj| j ∈ [0, 1]} maximizes the regulator’s welfare,
{mj} = arg max{mj} s.t. (1) and (12)u(c,M). (13)
(iii) Region j cannot have a feasible strategy Rj(mj) that yields it higher
revenue (11) than in equilibrium, given the regulator’s anticipated de-
cision rule,
mj = arg max
mj
pij = arg max
mj
[fj(mj)− gj(mj)−Rj(mj)]. (14)
(iv) Region j provides the regulator at least with the level of utility than in
the case it offers nothing (Rj = 0), and the regulator responds optimally
given the other countries contribution functions,
u(c,M) ≥ max
{mj} s.t. (1) and (12)
u(c,M)
∣∣
Rj=0
.
The conditions (14) for all j are equivalent to the first-order conditions
∂pij
∂mj
= f ′j(mj)− g′j(mj)−R′j(mj) = 0 for j ∈ [0, 1]. (15)
Thus, in equilibrium, the change in the contributions of country j, Rj, due
to a change in the instrument mj equals the effect of that instrument on the
net output of that country, fj(mj) − gj(mj). These contribution schedules
are locally truthful. This concept can be extended to a globally truthful
contribution schedule that represents the preferences of country j at all policy
points (cf. Dixit et al. 1997) as follows:
Rj = max[fj(mj)− gj(mj)− yj, 0], (16)
where the integration constant yj is the output of country j in the case it
does not pay contributions, Rj = 0, and exceeds its emission quota [cf. (5)],
but the regulator chooses its best response, given the contribution schedules
of the other countries k 6= j.
From (12), (14) and (15) it follows that
c =
∫
arg max
mk
pik(mk)dk +
∫ 1
0
Rk(mk)dk,
∂c
∂mj
= R′j = f
′
j(mj)− g′j(mj).
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Given this and (1), the conditions (13) are equivalent to
0 =
1
uc(c,M)
du(c,M)
dmj
=
1
uc(c,M)
[
uc(c,M)
∂c
∂mj
+ um(c,M)
∂M
∂mj
]
= f ′j(mj)− g′j(mj) +
um(c,M)
uc(c,M)
for j ∈ [0, 1]. (17)
Given this, (1) and (16), the equilibrium with emission quotas – {mqj}, M q
and cq – is given by
f ′j(m
q
j)− g′j(mqj) +
um(c
q,M q)
uc(cq,M q)
= 0, Rqj = max[fj(m
q
j)− gj(mqj)− yj, 0] and
mqj
.
= arg max
mj
[fj(m
q
j)− gj(mqj)−Rj(mqj)]dj for j ∈ [0, 1],
cq =
∫ 1
0
max
mj
[fj(m
q
j)− gj(mqj)−Rj(mqj)]dj, M q .=
∫ 1
0
mqjdj. (18)
This leads to the following result:
Proposition 1 The use of emission quotas leads to the Pareto optimum,
{mqj} = {mpj}, M q = Mp and cq = cp.
6 Traded emission permits
In this section, the regulator determines traded emission permits Mj for
countries j ∈ [0, 1]. Total GHGs (1) are then equal to total emission permits:∫ 1
0
mkdk = M =
∫ 1
0
Mjdj. (19)
The common agency game is then the following. First, the countries j ∈
[0, 1] set their contributions Rj conditional on the regulator’s prospective
policy Mj. Second, the regulator sets its policy {Mj} .= {Mj| j ∈ [0, 1]}
and collects the contributions Rj, k ∈ [0, 1]. Third, the price for emission
permits, p, adjust to clear the market (19) for emission permits. Fourth, the
representative firm in each country j ∈ [0, 1] chooses its energy input mj.
This game is solved in reverse order.
The profit of the representative firm in country j is [cf. (3)]
Πj
.
= yj + (Mj −mj)p = fj(mj)− gj(nj) + (Mj −mj)p, (20)
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where yj is income from production, Mj−mj the net supply of emission per-
mits and (Mj−mj)p net revenue from emission permits. The firm maximizes
its profit (20) by energy input mj, given smog nj, the emission permits Mj
and the price p for emissions. This yields the first-order condition
p = f ′j(mj) with
dp
dmj
.
= f ′′j < 0. (21)
Country j observes smog (2). From (2) and (21) it follows that pollution
nj and energy input mj depend on the price for emission permits:
nj = mj = Nj(p) with N
′
j
.
= 1/f ′′j < 0. (22)
The equilibrium condition for the emission permit market, (19), then becomes
M =
∫ 1
0
Nk(p)dk. Differentiating this equation totally yields the price as a
function of total pollution:
p(M), p′ =
(∫ 1
0
N ′kdk
)−1
< 0. (23)
Finally, plugging (23) into (22), yields smog nj as a function of GHGs M :
nj(M)
.
= Nj(p(M)) with n
′
j
.
= N ′jp
′ =
(∫ 1
0
N ′kdk
)−1
N ′j ∈ [0, 1]. (24)
Because country j influences the regulator by its contributions Rj, its
contribution schedule depends on the regulator’s prospective policy Mj. The
revenue of country j is equal to the profit (20) minus contributions Rj(Mj),
and it is a function of the emission permits Mj of that country and GHGs
M [cf. (3) and (24)] as follows:
pij(Mj,M)
.
= Πj −Rj = yj + (Mj −mj)p−Rj(Mj)
= max
mj
[
fj(mj)− gj
(
nj(M)
)
+ (Mj −mj)p(M)
]−Rj(Mj),
∂pij
∂Mj
= p−R′j,
∂pij
∂M
= −g′jn′j + (Mj −mj)p′. (25)
Given this and the contribution functions Rj(Mj), consumption (10) becomes
c =
∫ 1
0
pik(Mk,M)dk +
∫ 1
0
Rk(Mk)dk. (26)
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The regulator maximizes utility u(c,M) subject to emissions (19) and
consumption (26), while each country j maximizes its revenue (25). A sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is a set of contribution schedules
Rj(Mj) and a policy Mj for all countries j ∈ [0, 1] such that
{Mj} = arg max{Mj} s.t. (19) and (26)u(c,M), (27)
Mj = arg max
Mj s.t. (19)
pij(Mj,M), (28)
u(c,M) ≥ max
{Mj} s.t. (19) and (26)
u(c,M)
∣∣
Rj=0
.
The conditions (28) are equivalent to
0 =
∂pij
∂Mj
+
∂pij
∂M
∂M
∂Mj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= p−R′j(Mj)− g′jn′j + (Mj −mj)p′
and
R′j(Mj) = p− g′jn′j + (Mj −mj)p′ for j ∈ [0, 1]. (29)
Conditions (29) say that in equilibrium the change in the contributions of
country j, Rj, due to a change in the instrument Mj equals the effect of that
instrument on the revenue of that country, pij. These contribution schedules
are locally truthful. This concept can be extended to a globally truthful
contribution schedule that represents the preferences of country j at all policy
points (cf. Dixit et al. 1997) as follows:
Rj = max[pij − yj, 0], (30)
where the integration constant yj is the revenue of country j in case it does
not pay contributions, Rj = 0, but the regulator chooses its best response,
given the contribution schedules of the other countries k 6= j. If country
j refuses to pay contributions, Rj = 0, then it must content itself with its
opportunity revenue yj [cf. (5)].
From (26) and (28) it follows that
c =
∫
arg max
Mk
pik(Mk,M)dk +
∫ 1
0
Rk(Mk)dk.
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Noting this, (19), (21), (25) and (29), one obtains the partial derivatives
∂c
∂Mj
=
∫
k 6=j
∂pik
∂M
∂M
∂Mk︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
dk +R′j =
∫
k 6=j
[−g′kn′k + (Mk −mk)p′]dk +R′j
= −
∫
k 6=j
g′kn
′
kdk + p
′
∫
k 6=j
(Mk −mk)dk︸ ︷︷ ︸
=mj−Mj
+R′j
= −
∫
k 6=j
g′kn
′
kdk + (mj −Mj)p′ +R′j︸ ︷︷ ︸
=p−g′jn′j
= −
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk + p
= −
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk + f
′
j for j ∈ [0, 1].
Given this, the conditions (27) are equivalent to
0 =
1
uc(c,M)
du(c,M)
dMj
=
∂c
∂Mj
+
um
uc
∂M
∂Mj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= −
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk + f
′
j +
um
uc
for j ∈ [0, 1]. (31)
Because terms
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk and um/uc are equal for all j ∈ [0, 1], from (31)
it follows that f jm are equal for all j ∈ [0, 1] as well. The equations (31)
violate the first of the Pareto optimality conditions (18). Comparing this
with proposition 1, the following result is obtained:
Proposition 2 Emission trading decreases welfare by equalizing the marginal
product of energy, f jm, throughout all countries j ∈ [0, 1].
7 Effects of emission trading
As a point of reference, I consider first the case where technology and re-
sources are identical in all countries,
mj = nj = m, fj(m) = f(m) and gj(n) = g(n) for j ∈ [0, 1]. (32)
From (22) and (24), it then follows that Nj(p) = N(p) and n
′
j = 1 for
j ∈ [0, 1]. Noting this and (32), the equilibrium condition (31) becomes the
first of the Pareto optimality conditions (18):
0 = −
∫ 1
0
g′(m)n′kdk + fm +
um
uc
= −g′(m) + f ′(m) + um
uc
.
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Thus, the inefficiency of emission permit trading is due to the heterogeneity
of the countries.
Finally, I examine the effect of emission trading on GHGs. For this pur-
pose, I introduce a parameter β so that there is no emission trading mj = Mj
for β = 0 and emission trading mj 6= Mj for β = 1, and combine the equi-
librium conditions without and with trading, (17) and (31), as follows:
0 =
1
uc(c,M)
du(c,M)
dMj
= −β
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk + f
′
j − (1− β)g′j +
um
uc
for j ∈ [0, 1].
(33)
The effect of β on emission permits Mj is first derived on the assumption
that β is continuous in the limit [0, 1]. Then, by the mean value theorem,
the result can be extended for the discrete choice β ∈ {0, 1}.
From (24) it follows that n′j > 0 and
∫ 1
0
n′jdj = 1. The damage of smog
in country j – i.e. the decrease of income in that country due to smog nj
– is given by g′j [cf. (3)]. If that damage is smaller in country j than the
n′j-weighed average of the damages of all countries,
g′j <
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk, (34)
then one can call the localized technology in country j is relatively clean. If
g′j >
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk, (35)
then the localized technology in country j is called relatively dirty.
If the equilibrium defined by the first-order condition (33) is unique, then
the second-order condition (1/uc)
d2u
dM2j
< 0 must hold true. Given this, differ-
entiating (33) totally yields
dMj
dβ
= − 1
uc
du2
dMjdβ
[
1
uc
d2u
d2Mj
]−1
=
[∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk − g′j
]
1
uc︸︷︷︸
+
[
1
uc
du2
d2Mj︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
]−1
< 0
⇔ g′j <
∫ 1
0
g′kn
′
kdk.
This result shows that the source of welfare loss for emission trading (cf.
proposition 2) is the following:
12
Proposition 3 With the introduction of emission trading, the self-interested
regulator provides less permits to countries with relatively clean localized tech-
nology [for which (34) holds], and more permits to countries with relatively
dirty localized technology [for which (35) holds].
8 Pollution as a stock
In global warming problems, it is the stock of GHGs that causes damages
and not the flow. For this reason, I assume now that aggregate pollution M
and smog nj are stocks that are accumulated by emissions. The equations
(1) and (2) must then be replaced by the differential equations
dM
dt
=
∫ 1
0
mjdj − δM, dnj
dt
= mj − δjnj for j ∈ [0, 1], (36)
where t is time and the constants δ > 0 and δj > 0 characterize the absorbtion
of GHGs and the absorbtion of smog in country j, correspondingly.
If the system (36) is stable, it converges to the equilibrium
M =
1
δ
∫ 1
0
mjdj, nj =
mj
δj
for j ∈ [0, 1]. (37)
Because the common agency game between the regulator and the countries
j ∈ [0, 1] can be solved only in the stationary state (37), where GHGs M are
in fixed proportion 1/δ to global energy input
∫ 1
0
mjdj and smog nj in fixed
proportion 1/δj to local energy input mj, j ∈ [0, 1], then its solution leads to
the same results as in static case with the equations (1) and (2). This means
that proportions 1, 2 and 3 hold as they stand also when pollution is a stock.
9 Conclusions
This article examines the design of international emission policy when the
use of an emitting input (called energy) cause both global and localized
externality problems. The countries can authorize a self-interested regulator
to allocate emission permits and decide whether these permits can be traded.
Countries lobby the regulator, and they can exceed their permits only with
a penalty. The results are the following.
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With non-traded emission permits, the outcome is Pareto optimal: be-
cause the countries bargain over their quotas with the regulator, the marginal
product of energy in production is equal to the disutility of energy through
both global warming and smog. In the presence of emission trading, the
countries bargain over emission permits, but the trading of the firms sets the
marginal product of energy in production equal to the disutility of energy
through global warming only. Welfare then decreases, because the regulator
provides less permits to countries with relatively clean localized technology,
and more permits to countries with relatively dirty localized technology.
The analysis in this document is however based on the assumption that
the regulator belongs to the representative household. This clarifies the re-
sults, for changes of income distribution due to political contributions do not
affect efficiency in the model. Alternatively, one could use the model of Dixit
et al. (2007), in which the regulator’s utility is an increasing function of both
the household’s utility and the political contributions. This extension would
complicate the analysis, without nullifying the results concerning the policies
with emission quotas and the emission cap.
References:
Caplan, A.J., Cornes, R.C., and Silva, E.C.D. “An ideal Kyoto protocol:
emission trading, redistributive transfers and global participation.” Oxford
Economic Papers, 55 (2003): 216–234.
Caplan, A.J., and Silva, E.C.D. “An efficient mechanism to control correlated
externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and
global pollution permit markets.” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 49 (2005): 68–82.
Carbone, J.C., Helm, C., and Rutherford, T.F. “The case for international
emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy.” Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 58 (2009): 266–280.
Copeland, B.R., and Taylor, M.S. “Free trade and global warming: a trade
theory view of the Kyoto protocol.” Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management, 49 (2005): 205–234.
14
Dixit, A., Grossman, G.M., and Helpman, E. “Common agency and coor-
dination: general theory and application to management policy making.”
Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1997): 752-769.
Gersbach, H., and Winkler, R. “International emission quota markets with
refunding.” European Economic Review, 55 (2011): 759-773.
Godal, O., and Holtsmark, B. “Permit trading: merely an efficiency-neutral
redistribution away from climate-change victims?” Scandinavian Journal of
Economics 113 (2011): 784–797.
Hintermann, B. “Market power, permit allocation and efficiency in emission
permit markets.” Environmental and Resource Economics, 49 (2011): 327–
349.
Holtsmark, B., and Sommervoll, D.E. “International emissions trading: good
or bad?” Economics Letters, 117 (2012): 362–364.
Liski, M., and Montero, J.P. “A note on market power in an emission permits
market with banking.” Environmental and Resource Economics, 31 (2005):
159–173.
MacKenzie, I.A. “Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice.” Re-
source and Energy Economics 33 (2011): 268uˆ278.
MacKenzie, I.A., Hanley, N., and Kornienko, T. “The optimal initial alloca-
tion of pollution permits: a relative performance approach.” Environmental
and Resource Economics, 39 (2008): 265–282.
Malueg, D.A., and Yates, A.J. “Citizen participation in pollution permit
markets.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 51 (2006):
205–217.
McGinty, M. “International environmental agreements among asymmetric
nations.” Oxford Economic Papers, 59 (2006): 45uˆ62.
Montgomery, W.D. “Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control pro-
grams.” Journal of Economic Theory, 5 (1972): 395uˆ418.
Meunier, G. “Emission permit trading between imperfectly competitive prod-
uct markets.” Environmental and Resource Economics, 50 (2011): 347–364.
Palokangas, T. “International emission policy with lobbying and technologi-
cal change.” In: Crespo Cuaresma, J., Palokangas T. and Tarasyev, A. (eds.)
15
Dynamic Systems, Economic Growth and the Environment. Springer Verlag
(Heidelberg 2009).
Palokangas, T. “One-parameter GHG emission policy with R&D-based
growth.” In: Moser, E., Semmler, W., Tragler, G. and Veliov, W.M. (eds.)
Dynamic Optimization in Environmental Economics. Springer Verlag (Hei-
delberg 2014).
Shiell, L. “Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution per-
mits.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46 (2003):
38–51.
Smith, S.C., and Yates, A.J. “Optimal pollution permit endowments in mar-
kets with endogenous emissions.” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 46 (2003): 425–445.
16
